Portland State University

PDXScholar
City Club of Portland

Oregon Sustainable Community Digital Library

5-2-1969

Interim Report on Portland Mass Transit and the
1969 Oregon Legislative Assembly
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub
Part of the Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.), "Interim Report on Portland Mass Transit and the 1969 Oregon
Legislative Assembly" (1969). City Club of Portland. 246.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub/246

This Report is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in City Club of Portland
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible:
pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

PORTLAND

CITY

CLUB B U L L E T I N

INTERIM REPORT
ON

PORTLAND MASS TRANSIT
and the

1969 OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

The Committee: Robert S. Ball, Hobart M. Bird, Ronald C. Cease,
William C. Church, John H. Ever, Emerson LeClercq, Howard V. Morgan,
Thomas M. Poulsen, James M. Stewart and Norman A. Stoll, Chairman.

The City Club of Portland
505 Woodlark Bldg.
Portland, Oregon 97205
Printed in Portland City Club Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 48

329

330

PORTLAND

CITY

CLUB

BULLETIN

P O R T L A N D CITY CLUB B U L L E T I N

331

INTERIM REPORT
ON

PORTLAND MASS TRANSIT
and the

1969 OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
To the Board of Governors,
The City Club of Portland:

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Portland is facing a crisis in public transportation. On November 15, 1968,
the Rose City Transit Co. filed an official request with the City of Portland that it
be granted an increase in fares as a result of added costs of operation due chiefly
to a new one-year wage agreement with the Amalgamated Transit Union which
called for an immediate wage increase and a second increase on May 1, 1969. ( 2 )
The cost of an ordinary adult cash fare would have increased from $.35 to $.40
under the proposed new schedule. There would be similar increases in the cost of
tokens and school fares, and the weekly pass would be eliminated.
The City responded on December 12, 1968 by granting some of the requested
fare relief (but not the requested increase from $.35 to $.40) and by serving notice
of revocation and termination of the Rose City Transit franchise, effective June 12,
1969.
As a result of this action the City seems to face five alternatives in regard to its
public transportation system: (1) allowing service to be eliminated entirely; (2)
rescinding its December 12 notice and allowing Rose City Transit to continue under
either the existing or a re-negotiated franchise; (3) awarding a franchise to another
private corporation; (4) operating of the system itself directly or by contract; and
(5) allowing another public agency, such as the Port of Portland or some other
metropolitan commission, to assume responsibilities for operating public transit.
The problem is made more complex by the fact that the five suburban bus lines
serving the metropolitan area are facing similar higher operating costs that could
lead to higher fares and/or reduction or termination of services.
The Board of Governors directed your Committee to "observe, study and
analyze the process now under way by which the City of Portland will take over the
operations of the Rose City Transit Company." The Board has asked your Committee to pay particular attention to technical, economic, legal and other problems
in the takeover, to development of an overall metropolitan transportation system,
to relevant state legislation, to the impact of the takeover on municipal finance and
taxation, and to the provision of adequate transportation facilities for the economically and physically disadvantaged.
Your Committee has interpreted this mandate to encompass not only the immediate crisis presented by the Rose City Transit's demand for fare increases and
(')Mass Transit is a term variously used to describe urban-area rail transportation, urban area
transportation conducted on a private or segregated right of way whether by rail cars or
bus, or urban area public transportation of any character except for taxis or other vehicles
available for individual hire. As used in this report it is used in this third sense, in relation
to passengers only.
(2)Since preparation of this report, the Portland transit crisis has entered a new phase by
reason of Rose City Transit's April 24 demand for a further rate increase.
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the City's takeover notice, but also the longer-term outlook for transit service and
the means for accomplishing an adequate level of service. Your Committee hopes
to deal with these longer-term aspects more adequately in its final report at a later
date. However, since doubt has been cast on the legitimacy of steps taken by the
City toward an immediate takeover, and since the Oregon Legislative Assembly is
still in session, your Committee deemed it expedient to issue this interim report
before adjournment of the legislature.
Persons appearing before or interviewed by your Committee since its organization on February 5 included the following: the late Carl J. Wendt, City of Portland
Director of Transportation; John D. Mosser, attorney for the Port of Portland; Mrs.
Wm. D. Hagenstein, Chairman of the Metropolitan District Committee of the
Metropolitan Study Commission; Don Carlson, staff member, Metropolitan Study
Commission; A. M. Rich, Executive Secretary, Metropolitan Study Commission;
Fred Utevsky, Seattle planning consultant and Chairman of the Seattle Municipal
League's Mass Transit Committee; Marion Rushing, Portland City Attorney;
Representative Frank Roberts, Vice Chairman of the House Committee on Urban
Affairs and author of House Bill 1786; Representative Douglas Graham, member,
House Committee on Urban Affairs and author of House Bill 1808: Senator Donald
R. Husband, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Local Government and sponsor
of Senate Bill 494; Herbert Emerson, staff assistant to the House Committee on
Urban Affairs; and Jane Gearhart, Office of the Legislative Counsel and drafter of
various transit proposals. In addition to some of the legislative work sessions and
hearings on mass transit proposals, members of your Committee also attended a
meeting of the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG) called for
the purpose of receiving the views of various concerned local officials regarding
development of a regional mass transit plan, and at which the observations of
Oregon and Washington state highway officials were presented. The Committee
has not interviewed any members of the City Council partly because of the press
of time, but primarily because the Council obviously was relying substantially on
Mr. Wendt for the same information being sought by your Committee.
The Present System of Public Transportation

Since World War II public transportation in Portland has seen a steady downward spiral in patronage. This has been accomplished by reductions in service and
increases in fares which in turn have discouraged patronage even more, as exemplified in the following table relating to Rose City Transit operations in recent years:
Year

Revenue Passengers

Annual
Change
—

Cumulative Decrease
(Since 1963)
—

1963
19,958,478
1964
(1,735,250)
18,223,228<A>
(1,735,250)
1965
18,048,104
(1,910,394)
( 175,124)
(1,713,515)
18,244,963
1966
176,859
(2,420,862)
17,537,616""
1967
( 707,347)
(2,640,878)
1968
17,317,600
( 220,016)
c*)Fare increase November, 1963; increased revenue, decreased patronage.
(B)Fare increase March, 1967; increased revenue, decreased patronage.

Although some new bus lines have been extended into suburban areas, in competition with existing services, the steady downward trend in passengers has been
reflected generally in a reduction in routes and a decrease in the frequency of
operations. It is now impossible to travel by public transportation in a north-south
direction on the east side of Portland without following a circuitous, time-consuming
route that passes through the downtown area.
An unfortunate aspect of our public transportation problem is that the present
system has in recent years been viewed by most concerned parties as a holding
action. Despite the steady deterioration of transit service and ultimate threat of
its extinction, the City government apparently has made little if any effort to plan
for future development. It has developed no contingency plans to effect a takeover
of operation from Rose City Transit, nor has it explored the possibilities inherent
in new transportation technology for meeting the needs of a growing population.
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A consulting firm hired by the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan Transportation
Study in July 1966 proposed the establishment of alternative 7.5 mile high-speed
routes utilizing busses on existing and proposed freeways, including some use of an
extensive, exclusive transit right-of-way, and connecting the downtown area with the
Lloyd Center; but the Committee has found no evidence of any steps taken by the
City to implement or even to accept or reject these suggestions.
With all of its present faults and deficiencies, the existing transit system still
serves vital needs. It provides transportation for children, the aged, the poor, the
physically handicapped and others unable to drive or own automobiles. Elimination or further deterioration of the system is unthinkable if either public welfare
or economic considerations are given their due. Not only does mass transit tend
to meet the needs of those without automobiles, but also it is an important auxiliary
service for the majority of citizens who do drive—a fact dramatized during the
recent immobilization of cars in the winter snows.
A sound system of public transportation has the potential to reduce threats to a
city's livability from automobile-generated noise, air pollution, traffic congestion,
and conversion of commercial space to parking facilities. Furthermore, well-planned
public transportation, in coordination with planning for roads, sewers, water supply,
and other public services, has potential value in shaping desired directions of metropolitan growth, just as the electric interurban routes had marked influence in the
expansion of the city at the turn of the century, and as freeway development has
guided residential and industrial locations in the postwar era.
Essentials of a Sound Public Transportation System

The present transportation crisis suggests the urgency of examining the overall
objectives and requirements of public transportation and of making a fresh start
towards meeting these needs. To achieve an adequately planned and operated
system, at least three considerations must be pursued:
(1) It must be recognized that the City of Portland has but half of the
metropolitan area's total population, and even smaller percentage of its area.
Public transportation is not a matter of concern solely to the residents of the city,
but to the metropolitan area as a whole. The area of operations and the base for
public subsidy should include as much as possible of the Portland Metropolitan
Area.*')
(2) There must be a harmony between public transportation and all other
aspects of the urban community. Transit can no longer be seen as an isolated
function whose scope is circumscribed by the criterion of immediate profitability.
The experience of other areas indicates that public transportation in the present
automotive era can no longer survive without public subsidy. However, such
subsidy can be more than offset by indirect economic benefits to the community
in such elements as savings in time and reduction in the the soaring costs of
highway construction and parking facilities. To realize a maximum of such savings,
however, public transportation must be coordinated with land use planning and
programs for meeting social goals. Such coordination requires that the agency in
charge of public transportation must be part of an integrated framework of decisionmaking, rather than being a separate autonomous governmental body such as the
State Highway Commission.
(3) To ensure success, a transportation system needs to enjoy the confidence
of the public through its continuing involvement of the citizenry in the processes
of planning and implementating transit services. Public confidence in the system
and public support for it go hand in hand. Both are dependent upon good planning,
which in turn comes only from public involvement at levels of activity sufficient to
assure the maximum of "feedback" to the planners who are attempting to weigh
such alternatives as may be open.
Present Handicaps to Achieving Sound Public Transportation

The achievement of a comprehensively-planned metropolitan public transportation system is currently limited by several factors. These include the political
OMultnomah, Clackamas, Washington and Clark counties comprise Portland's Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area. In addition, portions of Columbia and Yamhill might well be
included.
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fragmentation of the area into two states, several counties, and up to three (4)dozen
incorporated cities. As a previous study of the City Club has concluded, the
present loose confederation of local bodies into the Columbia Region Association
of Governments (CRAG) has proved to be a weak beginning for the mounting task
of meeting metropolitan-wide programs in planning. The devastating impact of
fragmentation is evident in the fact that CRAG has evolved largely out of lack of
any viable alternatives, and largely at the instance of federal officials frustrated by
their previous inability to integrate their programming of grants to the metropolitan
area.
Associated with this territorial fragmentation of the metropolitan area is the
functional fragmentation of governmental authority. A plethora of local, state and
federal agencies provides or regulates roads, airports, welfare services and the like,
and performs other functions affecting the urban environment and urban growth
for better of worse, both within and outside the city limits, but at present with no
effective local coordination of their activities. Moreover, the unincorporated areas
of the region's counties are provided essential urban services of water supply, sewage
disposal, fire protection, and other items by a bewildering overlapping array of more
than 400 special districts, each usually having but a single function.
The chronic shortage of funds for local governments is perhaps the most
pressing handicap. This is the governmental level over which the public can exert
its most effective controls on spending. Continuously faced with the prospect of a
taxpayers' revolt in reaction to the mounting costs of all levels of government, public
officials have been reluctant to undertake as a new governemntal function the
operation of a public transportation system largely because of its probable need for
subsidy. Rather than meeting the challenge head-on, they have preferred to permit
continued franchise operations by private carrier.
The Specific Need for Areawide Legislative Enabling Action

The Portland City Council is now faced with the consequences of its December
12 actions. Unless a new agreement is made with the Rose City Transit or some
other entity before June 12 of this year, the City will be forced to operate the busses
itself or allow service to end. If the City does elect to operate transit services, it will
at best be continuing an unsatisfactory system. It does not have the financial
reserves necessary to expand and improve service. In the face of rising costs and
declining patronage, the City in all probability could not indefinitely maintain even
the present levels without an increase of taxes to provide subsidy. Moreover, it is
constitutionally handicapped in any expansion of routes beyond three miles from
its city limits. Even within this area it has little or no incentive to expand or
continue service because service in outlying areas usually results in a low ratio
of passengers (and revenue) to miles traveled (expense), and because the burden
of subsidy for fringe-area service probably would have to be borne by taxpayers
as well as by riders within the city limits.
The City has recognized that the area it could reasonably serve within its
existing financial limitations would fall far short of the metropolitan area needing
service. Other factors contribute to the urgency of finding some suitable areawide
vehicle for transit operations: e.g. Expiration of the present franchise is imminent
(end of 1972). Further crises undoubtedly will arise before then. We must be prepared to meet these contingencies.
It must be recognized that an appropriate solution should be areawide, comprehensive, acceptable to the public—and timely. The establishment of an areawide
agency of this nature is particularly timely because its "seating in" period will
coincide with the completion by CRAG of the first land use planning study encompassing the entire metropolitan area.
Any such attainment of an acceptable framework for planning and operating
a metropolitan transportation system obviously requires enabling legislation by
state government. Because such legislation should be passed in the current Legislative Assembly in order to meet immediate problems and to minimize the hazards
of future crises, your Committee submits the following interim evaluations of the
situation and the pending legislative proposals to remedy it.
WPlanning for Transportation in the Portland Metropolitan Area, Portland City Club Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 27, December 6, 1968.
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II. THE CITY OF PORTLAND AND MASS TRANSIT TODAY
Scope of City of Portland Authority

The authority of the City of Portland in the field of public transportation is
presently governed primarily by the City's charter and by a City ordinance granting
a non-exclusive franchise for the operation of a bus system to Rose City Transit.
The City Charter provides the City with a broad power which may be exercised
in any lawful manner to "construct, condemn, purchase, add to, acquire, maintain,
operate and own all or any part of any public utility or any plant or enterprise, for
the purpose of serving the city and the people thereof for uses public and private."
Other charter provisions of course confer broad powers to tax City residents and
to borrow money for municipal functions.
The City Council has general supervision and power of regulation of transportation utilities within the City and a three-mile limit beyond its boundaries; moreover, it hasflexibilityto be either assertive or non-assertive with respect to its powers
to investigate the affairs of any public utility in the City, to regulate such utilities
based upon its findings, and to insure that fares charged to the public are just, fair
and reasonable.
The charter provides that the City's power of control and regulation of a
franchisee "cannot be limited, divested or granted away" either by the terms of a
franchise, ordinance or otherwise. The City Council thus is invested with an
affirmative obligation not merely to contract on behalf of the public for reasonable
public transportation on reasonable terms, but also to insure on a continuing basis
that the franchise is operated in the public interest. Although state law appears to
confer upon the state Public Utility Commissioner certain regulatory authority over
transit operations within city boundaries, no other governmental body is charged
with authority or responsibility equivalent to that exercised by the City Council on
this field, and the City has vociferously defended its exclusive right to control transit
operations within its boundaries (and the adjoining three-mile limit) in such
manner as it deems appropriate.
This sweeping authority has been exercised since 1962 primarily through the
grant of a ten-year franchise to Rose City Transit, a company whose operations are
confined largely to areas within the city limits of Portland. This franchise gives Rose
City Transit the non-exclusive right "to establish, own, maintain and operate motor
coach lines and to transport passengers and goods for hire . . ." in Portland until
January 1, 1973.
Service in Metropolitan Portland Outside City Boundaries

The authority of the City to deal effectively with transit requirements beyond
city limits is severely restricted by the three-mile limit mentioned above. And,
in the absence of a more detailed analysis than has been practicable for this report,
it would be unfair to criticize the City for not using its existing authority over
transit, its control over streets, and its other police powers as leverage to compel
integration of public transportation throughout the metropolitan area. It may well
be that such a result, if attainable at all under existing law, could have been
accomplished only at prohibitive cost to riders within the City proper.
The fact remains, however, there is no such integration of service. The
City has shown no disposition to devise or enforce workable transfer privileges
between suburban and City lines despite efforts of a major suburban line to seek
such privileges in consideration of invasion of its territory by Rose City Transit. The
City has allowed Rose City Transit to extend its service into nearby suburban areas
on a basis that has allowed that company to skim some of the cream from some of
the suburban lines' service areas. The latter may well have resulted in improved
service in the immediate areas of extended Rose City Transit service, but it has
jeopardized the economic foundation of remaining services and quite probably has
contributed to curtailment of such services in recent years.
The net effect has been to compel many potential suburban riders to pay two
full fares, suburban and City, if they desired public transportation between their
homes and some City work center outside the downtown area, and to reduce or
eliminate some suburban schedules. Increasing numbers of suburbanites have
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chosen to rely upon their private cars for transportation into the City, aggravating
an already bad traffic, pollution and parking problem.
The Present Rose City Franchise in Perspective

Unfortunately, much of the City flexibility in the exercise of its authority even
within City boundaries has been lost by granting to Rose City Transit a franchise
which inhibits the City more than its regulates the Rose City Transit. Your Committee has unanimously concluded that the present Rose City Transit franchise is
not a model for documents of its kind.
It is the latest in a scries of post-World War II franchises that have been strongly
influenced by the declining patronage of urban motor coach facilities tabulated
above. This decline has been in direct proportion to the rise in private motor vehicle
registrations and has coincided with the increasingly strong negotiating position of
the owners and managers of Rose City Transit and its predecessors in their dealings
with the City Council.
The reasons for this seemingly anomalous situation are not difficult to find.
The City Council is faced with two hard facts. On the one hand it is confronted
by a Rose City Transit management that in the past has not hesitated to temporarily
abandon outright its obligation to maintain service to the public, and that undoubtedly will threaten to do so again if its demands are not met. On the other
hand the Council is confronted by a downtown business community keenly aware
that at least two-thirds of all bus passengers travel to or through the central business
district. For this reason the business community has been accustomed, in each
recurring crisis, to insist on maintenance of service in accordance with the short-run
status quo.
Between crises there has been a tendency to ignore probable future developments. The net effect has been to make the business community an unwitting and
probably unwilling ally of Rose City Transit in extracting concessions from the
Council. These concessions may have been useful in postponing a breakdown of
service from one crisis to the next, but they have increased the probability that a
future breakdown or major dislocation of service can be prevented only by a radically new approach—toward a more permanent solution of the problem.
The Council also must face the fact that the bulk of the public which does
not at this time patronize urban mass transit is complacent, while the minority of
the public which is dependent on mass transit is unorganized and for the most part
inarticulate. But the Council has exerted no effective leadership toward revision
of these attitudes. Thus it finds itself without effective public support in its efforts
to deal with the company on a long-range basis, though it knows the public will be
quick to denounce the Council if service does break down.
The present franchise is a direct product of the factors listed above and is
remarkable chiefly because (apart from many pages of routine route descriptions)
it is on its face more concerned with the details of takeover of transit operations and
property by the City rather than with long-range public service by Rose City Transit.
It is primarily an invitation and a formula for operation of mass transit by the City
of Portland, based on prospective City purchase of the company's property and
equipment. A close reading of the franchise discloses terms extremely favorable to
Rose City Transit in the event of such a takeover, as well as during interim operations by that company. In fact, the only really advantageous aspect of the franchise,
from the City's point of view, is a provision for deferred payment for the newer
rolling stock through the City's issuance, to Rose City Transit, of revenue certificates bearing interest at four percent.
The franchise declares that Rose City Transit*5' ". . . should have an opportunity to earn a return of not less than four and one-half percent and not more than
six and one-half percent . . ." after all operating expenses, including taxes and
depreciation. This seems modest enough at first glance. Indeed, it has not been
disputed that a fare increase was a legitimate request by Rose City Transit under
(')References to Rose City Transit throughout this discussion are intended to refer as well to
its corporate affiliates. The franchise provisions relating to termination of the franchise
and acquisition by the City apply to property accounts of corporate affiiliates as well as
Rose City Transit Co. itself.
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the terms of the franchise, for that
company has never received the minimum
"return" specified in the franchise.(6)
What may appear peculiar to the public, however, is the fact that in each year
since 1963, when the franchise became effective, and during a period of declining
patronage, Rose City Transit has enjoyed substantial earnings. Net profits after
depreciation and taxes calculated as provided in the present franchise as follows:

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

$150,986
227,357
207,959
124,960
201,598 7
133,681 <>

A more careful review of the franchise discloses the answer to this baffling
combination of circumstances. It lies in definition of the word "return" in the
franchise. The "return" is not on investment, as is customary in most good regulatory practice; the "return" is on gross "operating revenues"—a much larger
figure having no relationship whatever to Rose City Transit's actual capital investment less depreciation.
No analysis of the Rose City Transit's books appear to have been made by the
City either in accordance with normal regulatory practice or in accordance with the
limited demands of the franchise itself, though the City employs a capable rate
analyst. So it is difficult to say what Rose City Transit may have been earning on
its depreciated net investment. Enough fragments of financial information appear
in Mr. Wendt's report, however, to support a conservative estimate that the average
return on actual investment has not been less than ten percent and quite probably
more.
The exact percentage of such return is academic, for Rose City Transit is in the
enviable position of possessing a franchise which enables it to base its "reasonable"
profit on a percentage of gross revenues (i.e., the total farebox "take" rather than
the investment) to get this profit after it has paid its taxes and has retained so much
of its cash revenues as the franchise allows to be kept as a depreciation allowance,
and then to demand fare increases from the City Council on account of its failure
to earn a minimum "return" (as defined in the franchise). Historically, Rose City
Transit has found no financial impediment to continued operations despite lack of
the specified minimum "return" defined in the franchise.
The franchise contains voluminous provisions looking toward acquisition of
Rose City Transit's property and equipment by the City through lease, purchase or
condemnation. The City appears, on the face of the franchise, however, to have
bargained and contracted away its right to condemn or in any other way to purchase
for a fair price the only Rose City Transit rolling stock which would be attractive
to the City or to any other operator:
the seventy-five busses purchased by Rose City
Transit between 1961 and 1967.(8) (The other rolling stock was estimated by Mr.
Wendt to be over 18 years old . . . characteristically referred to by him as "junkers.")
The franchise provides that if the City takes over bus operations it must
purchase the 75 newer busses at a "reasonable price" which is set forth in the
franchise ordinance (section 13) as a specific formula that seems unduly to favor
Rose City Transit. The price is to be calculated as follows: ". . . the replacement
cost at the time of purchase by the City, less depreciation on a straight-line basis
over anticipated life of fifteen years." It should be noted here that for rate-making
purposes, the franchise provides that the same busses be depreciated over an eightvear life.
WThe November, 1968 report by the late Carl Wendt, the City's Director of Transportation,
indicates the Company's profits during the past six years have averaged 3.48 percent (of
gross revenues), reaching a 4.36 percent peak for 1964.
(7>The 1963-1967 figures are taken from Mr. Wendt's November 27, 1966 report which
estimated $206,260 net revenue for 1968. The above table also sets forth the 1968 actual
comparable amount as reported to the Committee by Rose City Transit comptroller.
WThere may well be doubt as to whether the City can legally bargain away its right to
exercise its powers of eminent domain. It has not been practicable for your Committee to
inquire into this or related questions, including the possibility of the City's condemning
contract rights (i.e. the Rose City Transit franchise).
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The foregoing differentiation in depreciation rates means that, if the City (or
any agency of the City) takes over bus operations, it can do so only by paying a
heavy premium for the only busses owned by Rose City Transit that can be
operated efficiently. For example, if the City acquires in 1969 a bus purchased by
Rose City Transit in 1961, price calculations must'be based not on what was
actually paid for the bus in 1961 but on what the same bus would cost now. From
this inflated figure there would be deducted an amount deemed to be eight years'
depreciation based on a 15-year life—or eight-fifteenths of the 1969 price, or
slightly more than half. It should be remembered, however, that Rose City Transit,
using an eight-year life for rate-making purposes, has already "expensed off" the
full 1961 cost of the bus as depreciation. In other words, after the rate-payers
have already repaid Rose City Transit 100 percent of its actual 1961 cost for that
bus, the City would pay Rose City Transit almost 50 percent of the higher 1969
price for the same bus (in9 addition, of course, to interest on City revenue certificates issued in payment.)* *
The franchise (in sections 24 and 25) provides for other means of acquistion
of Rose City Transit's older rolling stock and other property—most if not all of it
needed to sustain the present level of operations unless equivalent property can be
obtained elsewhere. These means include lease, purchase through arbitration,
purchase through condemnation. The City also has the option to decline the lease
or purchase of any property other than the seventy-five newer buses. But it is made
abundantly clear (in Sections 13 and 24) that if the City takes over bus operations,
the City must purchase the 75 newer busses and must pay for them according to
the contract formula described above.
Rose City Transit has been served with notice that the City desires to purchase
all of the real property, plant and equipment of Rose City Transit, and the City
is now having such property appraised. At any time prior to June 12, however,
the City may retract this decision and lease all or any part of such property from
the company in accordance with a formula in the franchise. This formula in
effect seems to amount to payment of the appraised principal value over a three
year period, unless the City in the meantime decides to terminate the lease or give
up its equity in the items of property as to which the lease is terminated.
It is doubtful that the impact of these takeover formulas on the City and its
ratepayers and taxpayers has been thoroughly analyzed. But it is clear that the
impact would be considerable except in the unlikely event that the takeover were
accompanied by a substantial infusion of new capital, and a massive rebuilding
and reconstruction of Portland's transit system that would dwarf the cost of the
buy-out of Rose City Transit.
Status of City's Takeover of Rose City Transit

From the foregoing review of the franchise terms, it may well be questioned
why the City should desire to take over Rose City Transit.
The answer lies in the Hobson's choice now left to the City as a practical
matter. It is faced with recurring threatened interruptions of service, further
demands for fare increases, a substantial risk of further declines in patronage and
in the public's transit riding habits before expiration of the franchise, and evidence
that even now many of the persons most in need of transit service can no longer
afford to ride the Rose City Transit busses. Those in authority appear to have
concluded that the City must take over Rose City Transit before the newest
busses which it is required to purchase become dilapidated and worthless, and
before the transit system suffers such a further decline in patronage that it becomes
wholly inoperable or salvageable as a going concern. They seem to have determined
that the City must assume operation of the system now in order that some transit
operation will actually be remaining when the present franchise expires.
Furthermore, however bad the terms of the franchise may be, they do provide
a means by which the City may acquire without immediate cash outlay (that the
Wit has been impracticable for your Committee to check into the present market value of
these 75 busses as used equipment, but it has been informed that the market for recentmodel used busses is good. No information regarding the current market price or the current
new equipment price for these busses is contained in the data given to your Committee by
the City.
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City can
ill-afford) the only Rose City Transit busses that can be operated efficiently.<10> By delaying a takeover, the City might deprive itself of the opportunity
to acquire reasonably modern and efficient busses upon issuance of the four percent
revenue certificates in full payment.
It will be noted that the consolidation outlined above rest on basic assumptions
that City operation will effect certain savings and will inhibit fare increases and
further deterioration of patronage and equipment. Your Committee is not prepared
to endorse the validity of these assumptions (beyond noting a shifting of tax
burdens to the "tax savings" noted below). But neither is your Committee prepared
to deny their validity particularly if City operation results in a greater concern for
the service needs of the public and somewhat less preoccupation with profitability
of the operation.
The franchise contains a provision that the City can revoke and terminate the
franchise at any time, after six months' notice, "for cause". "Cause" is one of the
few key words in the franchise which is not defined.
As noted in the introductory paragraph of this report, Rose City Transit in
November requested a fare increase that led to the City Council's letter of December
12 purporting to revoke and terminate Rose City Transit's franchise as of June 12,
1969. This letter stated that this action was being taken
". . . for the cause that fare increases above the present 350 level
cannot reasonably continue indefinitely as a matter of public good and
interest, that such increase along with possible future increases will result
in such additional loss of patronage as to render the mass transit service
within the City economically unfeasible and unreasonable despite the
public need and the benefit to the public and to the property owners of the
City from a reasonable transit service."
As the initial step in financial planning, Mr. Wendt provided the City with
his estimates of the revenues and expenses from the City's proposed operation of
the Rose City Transit system from June 1, 1969 to May 31, 1970. Assuming a
January 1, 1969 fare structure including the interim rate increase allowed by the
City Council prior to its announced termination of franchise, and assuming no
change in the present wage scale, Mr. Wendt calculated that the City would have
a net profit during such period amounting to $434,300. The bulk of this amount
($287,700) would be from "tax savings" attributable to operation of the system
by a non-taxpaying public entity. Mr. Wendt also calculated that under such
projections the City would be able to meet another wage increase in 1969.
Mr. Wendt's calculations thus suggest that City acquisition and operation of
the transit system is financially feasible, at least on a temporary basis. 0 " But it is
clear that the presently anticipated involvement of the City of Portland in the
transit operations now conducted by Rose City Transit can solve few if any of the
broader metropolitan transit needs. The Tualatin Valley system, operating with
severely deteriorated busses, will remain a separate entity largely unintegrated with
the Rose City Transit lines — as will each of the other suburban services. Moreover, the City has no department staffed for transportation planning, and the need
for such planning is with respect to a constituency much larger than that served
by the City of Portland.
Mr. Wendt's untimely death has seriously impaired the ability of the City to
prepare for the June 12 deadline for a takeover of Rose City Transit operations.
In order to provide an organizational and operational plan for the transit system,
the City on March 26, 1969 contracted with the consulting firm of Edmundson,
Kochendoerfer, Kennedy, Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (EKK-DMJM)
for a study which in part calls upon the firm to advise the City concerning its
problems in the acquisition process.
The initial phase of this study may not be available to the City until May 26,
barely two weeks prior to the June 12 deadline. But the City apparently does plan
0°)Assuming of course that the proposed takeover at this time is legally justified.
COEven with the mentioned "tax savings" that are an integral part of these calculations,
however, the feasibility of such operation would provide illusory if perchance the City
should wind up without a transit system but with a continuing obligation to pay the pensions of the transit system workers.
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to proceed with the takeover at such time and is relying substantially upon the study
of the consulting firm to prepare for the takeover and City operation thereafter.
Whether or not the City was justified in the legal, economic and financial
assumptions underlying its takeover notice may never be known. When the City
issued its December 12 takeover notice, Rose City Transit did not argue the truth
of the City's statement of facts but asserted that these facts did not constitute "cause"
and offered to negotiate with the City. There appears to be reasonable question
whether the City has proceeded in the proper legal manner and, if the City persists
in pursuing its present takeover efforts, the matter seems destined to go to court,
perhaps for a long period of time—probably the end of 1970 at the earliest. Or
the matter could be settled through negotiation, with Rose City Transit asking
terms for the sale of the older equipment at a price as attractive to it as that witb
respect to the newer equipment. In any event, the prospective outcome of the City's
takeover seems so unclear at this time that your Committee deemed it preferable
to defer further consideration of the takeover developments, in favor of the far
more pressing consideration of current legislative proposals that seek to afford a
more viable long-term alternative vehicle for Portland metropolitan area transit
operations.

III. TRANSIT MEASURES BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE
As of this writing, the Legislature has before it three measures to create a
new instrumentality for Portland metropolitan area transit services.
HB 1786, sponsored by the House Committee on Urban Affairs, to authorize
(but not require) the Port of Portland to acquire and operate a
transit system within the Portland metropolitan area;
HB 1808, sponsored by the House Committee on Urban Affairs, providing
for the establishment of mass transit districts, either upon voter
petition or upon resolution of local governing bodies, with members
of the governing body of each such district to be appointed by the
Governor, and empowering such districts to acquire and operate
transit systems within their boundaries;
SB 494, sponsored by Senator Husband upon the suggestion of various
groups interested in metropolitan government, providing for the establishment of metropolitan service districts either upon voter petition
or upon resolution of local governing bodies, with members of the
governing body of each such district to be chosen from among
representatives of governing bodies or existing local governments
within such district (or in any alternative method that may be
decided upon by the voters if they choose to adopt a charter), and
empowering such districts to acquire and operate sewer, sewage
treatment and disposal, solid waste disposal and public transportation facilities within their boundaries (in addition to performing
such other functions as the voters within the district might decide
by charter).
Each of these three legislative proposals to create or strengthen an organization
to take over and operate transit facilities represents a different approach to a
common problem — the need for a public corporate entity that transcends conventional boundaries of local government, that has adequate financing and other
powers to operate transit facilities, and that provides a management structure
deemed adequate to afford responsible direction of the affairs of the enterprise.
As of this writing, there is little activity on the first of these measures and no
more is expected; but a substantial consideration and a rewriting of the other two
appear to be moving forward. At this time it is impossible to ascertain with any
degree of certainty which of these measures (if any) will ultimately meet with
legislative favor, or, for that matter, the precise form that any of them may eventually take if enacted. Any of these measures may ultimately be amended to include
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particular features originally present only in one of the others. Also, any might be
changed to delete some feature distinguishing it from the others.
In these circumstances your Committee has oriented its commentaries on these
proposals primarily to the features of each bill, in the form introduced, that distinguish it from rival proposals seeking the same broad objectives. This seems more
useful than to concentrate on the technical details of the amendments presently
being proposed with respect to any of these measures for surely the array of technical experts and public officials now considering these measures is capable of
drafting suitable enabling clauses once the basic approaches are decided upon.
In addition to the three proposals noted above^ and some others of more peripheral significance relating to the funding of community and school services, there
are four others that appear to have some bearing on the future of mass transit in
the Portland metropolitan area:
HJR 12 would create an Interim Committee on Rapid Transit, consisting of
seven legislators and four "public members" selected by the presiding
officers of the two legislative houses, to "study the present status of
public rapid transit systems in the Willamette Valley and examine
proposals for modification of such systems and for the establishment
of new systems", and to report the results of such study to the next
Legislature. Although a well-intentioned measure introduced early
in the present session to focus upon a crying public need, this proposal for an Interim Committee seems to afford a less promising
approach to current transit problems than the proposal for a State
Department of Transportation, noted below. Actually, neither agency
can devise a program or schedule adequate to effect timely solution of
the problems presented by the Portland mass transit crises, present and
anticipated; and it would be tragic if either were seized upon as an
excuse for the Legislature to do nothing at this time with respect to
establishment of an action agency that is properly equipped to move
quickly in the Portland area.
HB 1020 as passed by the House, creates a State Department of Transportation which, among other things, would include a Mass Transit
Division as a "state-wide coordinating, planning and research
agency" in its field. It would afford continuing professional assistance to communities needing such service, and in the long run
could have a significant impact on future development, primarily
through the budget control over all transportation programs that
would be vested in the Director of the Department. The new Division might prove very helpful in staffing the transit planning of
smaller metropolitan centers throughout the state. But, as noted
above, the proposal probably comes too late, with too little, to afford
any immediate practical assistance in meeting imminent Portland
problems.
HB 1438 merely permits a public employer taking over transit operations to
exclude transit employees from the Public Employees Retirement
System implementing an earlier constitutional amendment that
contemplates retention of existing retirement systems covering employees of transit operations to be taken over by public authority.
HJR 50 sponsored by the House Urban Affairs Committee, proposes a constitutional amendment that would authorize use of a portion of
taxes on motor vehicles fuel or on ownership operation, or use of
motor vehicles to finance mass transist systems. It affords an additional method of financing such operations, and in a sense is a
legislative answer to a highly restrictive Attorney General's Opinion
dated March 18, 1969 which holds that such funds at present
cannot be used for such purposes.
None of the last four mentioned proposals, in and of itself, is of immediate
and substantial practical use in Portland's situation. And the measure most important to the Portland area — the constitutional amendment — can not be presented
to the voters for some months to come.
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Beyond noting its unanimous conclusion that any mass transit agency should
have the broadest and most flexible financing powers possible, your Committee
accordingly confines its expanded commentary to the measures that would afford
a vehicle for acquisition, development and operation of a Portland metropolitan
area mass transit system.
A.

COMMENTARY ON HB 1786 (PORT OF PORTLAND AUTHORIZATION)

For many years there have been suggestions that the Port of Portland is a readymade instrumentality for the accomplishment of precisely the ends noted above—
operation of mass transit by a public corporate entity that transcends conventional
local boundaries and has ample financing and other powers and adequate management for these purposes. However, its territorial limits are presently confiined to
Multnomah County. Moreover, Although it has broad authority to conduct rail and
marine transport operations, it lacks authority to operate busses. Furthermore, its
bonding and taxing authority has been managed with a view toward affording a
sound financial base for the promotional, industrial land development and airport
programs with which it has been identified to this date. It has done nothing so
ambitious as to subsidize mass transit. Its commissioners characteristically have
shown a distinct coolness to overtures suggesting they embark into transit operations, particularly if such operations require subsidyHouse Bill 1786 was designed to adapt existing Port legislation to present-day
transit operations by expanding the agency's boundaries to include Washington
and Clackamas Counties (section 1) and by adding to the Port's other powers the
authorization (but not a direction) to "provide mass transit within its boundaries"
(section 3). Section 4 states that "for the purpose of providing mass transit, the
Port may exercise any or all powers granted for any other purpose" by specified
sections of the present Port enabling legislation, including the capacity to sue,
authority to acquire and dispose of property and enter into contracts, eminent
domain, and the power to enact ordinances. Section 5 would enact new borrowing
and bonding provisions, permitting aggregate bonds outstanding at any one time
up to one and one-fourth percent of the true cash value of all property within its
limits "unless a greater amount is approved by the qualified voters" (although the
relationship of this new provision to existing bonding provisions is left obscure).
Sections 6 and 7 would confer taxing authority similar to that which the Port now
has with respect to its existing functions, up to one-half of one percent of true cash
value for mass transit purposes "unless a greater amount is approved by the qualified voters of the Port at an election called for that purpose". Section 8 authorizes
the Port commissioners to create within itself by ordinance, a five-man transit
authority appointed by the commissioners and serving at their pleasure, to whom
the commissioners might delegate any or all of their authority pertaining to transit
except for powers relating to borrowing, bonding and taxing. Section 9 would
authorize the Port to "contract with public or private corporations for the construction, operation or maintenance of mass transit" and to "acquire mass transit systems
within the Port or enter into agreements with mass transit systems for the purpose
of extending mass transit service beyond the limits of the Port", and would require
protection of the pension rights and other interests of employees and retired employees of any public transportation system which the Port acquires. The remaining
provisions of the bill deal with details of right-of-way, regulations and taxation,
including one provision which precludes an earmarking of the amounts of taxes
collected for transit purposes. No change would be made in the existing procedures
whereby Port commissioners are appointed by the Governor.
The obvious appeal of this bill is that it seems to afford a basis for immediate
action by a development-minded agency presently in existence, having a strong
tradition of competent management, enjoying widespread public confidence, having
extensive experience in business-type activities under long-standing legislation that
confers fiscal and other corporate powers reasonably adapted to the needs of mass
transit operations.
Despite its extensive experience in land development, trade promotion and
airport operation, Port officials point out that these activities are markedly different
in significant respects from those that characterize a mass transit system. They note
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that they presently have no operational responsibilities except in connection with
the airports and administration of real estate, that they normally have no direct
contact with the general public, and that they have no experience whatsoever with
supercharged labor relations such as characterize transit operations. They further
point out that all of their financial resources are presently committed to programs
they already administer, and they note that any expansion of their activity is almost
certain to require a test case in the courts to resolve constitutional problems arising
out of this effort to extend the boundaries of a municipal corporation by legislative
enactment without a vote of the affected public.
The Port is further fearful that the addition of another major responsibility
might seriously dilute the management of the Port, jeopardize its financial stability,
and deter high caliber people from accepting appointment to the nonremunerative
position of Port Commissioner. They further regard this proposed extension of the
Port's authority as incompatible with their efforts to extend the Port's boundaries
to encompass the entire lower Columbia.
In addition there is serious question as to whether an agency of this nature,
headed by commissioners appointed by the Governor, is sufficiently sensitive
politically to handle adequately a program in which there is such a prime need for
broad community participation in the decision-making processes. This situation is
somewhat aggravated by the provisions of the bill that would permit delegation of
most of the Port's responsibilities to the transit authority that would be appointed
by the commisioners themselves. In this connection it should be noted that none
of the Port commissioners is himself an elected official, and none has any responsibility to the various local officials whose regular duties are closely intertwined with
those of any agency that may attempt to create or operate a mass transit system.
B. COMMENTARY ON HB 1808 (TRANSIT COMMISSION)
House Bill 1808 authorizes creation of mass transit districts in the Portland area
or elsewhere. It is derived from previous proposals to establish metropolitan transit
authorities—bills that have received extensive legislative consideration in previous
sessions. The procedures for creation of mass transit districts (sections 2-8), (12)
however, are derived mainly from SB 4 1 , a proposal by the Interim Committee
on Local Government to provide uniform procedures for the fixing of various
district boundaries that likewise have received extensive study by the legislature.
Provisions for appointment of the Transit Commissions' governing board by
the Governor of the State (section 9) are similar to those relating to the Port of
Portland, but they are derived from a previous transit authority proposal. The
provisions relating to the general manager's functions (secions 19-21) and the
agency's regulatory ordinances (sections 22, 23) are derived from another previous
transit authority bill. Most of the corporate, planning and financing powers (e.g.
sections 13, 14, 24-35) are derived from House Bill 1154, dealing with water
control and other special districts, that has received extensive legislative consideration during the current session.
The remaining general provisions (section 37-46) as well as those relating to
annexation, mergers and dissolution (sections 47-61) are derived from SB 4 1 ,
mentioned above.
New matter in this bill as introduced provides that a mass transit district may
be created either upon petition by ten percent of the registered voters within the
limits of the proposed district or by motion of any county board or city council
within the district (section 3), invoking a procedure for formation comparable to
that prescribed by SB 494, discussed below.
The obvious advantage of this bill is its specific orientation to virtually immediate action on transit problems. Mass transit is certainly an activity sufficiently
large and important to justify special attention. This bill thus has much political
appeal because it minimizes the risk of continued obstruction by those who oppose
combining transit with other operations or who at this time arc reluctant to author(12) Section references herein to HB 1808 relate to the bill as originally introduced. Renumbering will occur as the result of amendments being adopted which are largely technical
in nature, not affecting the fundamental approaches taken in the bill as initially introduced-
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ize new metropolitan area governmental functions such as the sewage and solid
waste disposal contemplated in SB 494 (including the City of Portland).
Moreover, HB 1808 is enabling legislation of general applicability and it thus
avoids such problems as might have arisen had it dealt specifically only with the
Portland area. It thus captures the attention of downstate legislators who might
otherwise have limited interest in legislation affording relief to Portland.
On the other hand, like SB 494, HB 1808 proposes to place transit operations
in the hands of a newly created agency. Unlike HB 1786 (the Port Authority bill),
it does not give over the reins of authority to an existent body that already enjoys
public acceptance and confidence in its management, experience and competence.
Obviously the quality of the Governor's appointments would have an important
bearing on public confidence in the agency, and such appointments conceivably
might evoke more favorable public reaction than would attach to the local public
officials likely to be appointed under SB 494. On balance, however, your Committee is impressed with the fact that this bill has the same disadvantages as
HB 1786 in not specifically dealing with the special need for politically sensitive
management, for broad community participation, and for recognizing in some tangible way the inter-relationship between the transit authority and the government
bodies whose decisions are crucial to transit planning and management, or whose
responsibilities are strongly influenced by transit management's decisions. Furthermore, enactment of this bill would represent a reversal of the trend away from
proliferation of special purpose agencies — a trend exemplified in SB 494.
Finally, although there has been extensive legislative consideration of the
various bills from which HB 1808 has been derived, this measure is detailed and
complex in its particulars. Such detailed provisions not only afford a target for
opponents; they carry the risk that the agency's powers will be narrowly construed.
C. COMMENTARY ON SB 494 (METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT)
Senate Bill 494 is the outgrowth of similar but somewhat broader legislation
that was initially fostered at the last legislature. The earlier bill represented an
effort to permit essential municipal services to be conducted across county and
city boundaries without any further proliferation of numerous special-purpose
service districts, as has been characteristic of urban development throughout the
United States in recent years.
The presently proposed legislation clearly anticipates the eventual concentration, into each such district, of all service of any kind that can best be organized
on areawide bases within the boundaries of the district; but it endeavors to minimize political opposition by curtailing the district's functions at this time to those
for which there presently appears to be a pressing, urgent need and popular demand
(section 10). (13) In the form introduced, the bill leaves later expansion of the scope
of the district's activities and the manner of handling them to local determination
through adoption of charter provisions that may confer additional powers, change
the corporation's structure and prescribe procedures for the performance of its
functions (section 11).
The bill is nothing more than enabling legislation to permit either five percent
of the residents of the proposed district or the governing body of either its most
populous city or its most populous county to take the first steps toward the formation of a metropolitan district (section 4) that at this time might concern itself
with sewage, solid waste disposal and public transportation. The county governing
body thereafter would take charge of machinery for publication of notice, hearing,
registration of objections, and the mechanics of a popular election on the issue of
whether the district should be established (sections 5 , 7 ) . These procedures include
settlement of boundaries and may include the determination of the district's initial
tax base.
In general, the district's orientation would be to provide the "metropolitan
aspects" of the specified public services in addition to only those "local aspects"
as might be determined by agreement with the particular city or county or other
public corporation most directly involved with the local services (sections 10, 11,
12). The district itself, however, would have broad authority to determine what
(13)References herein are to SB 494 as introduced. Some renumbering of sections will occur as
the result of amendments.
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is "regional" or "metropolitan" in aspect, including the authority to take over any
facility or function of a local entity "to the extent necessary to provide the service"
but it would be obliged to pay the local entity the value of the facility as well as
an amount in the nature of severance charges with respect to functions left partly
under local jurisdiction (section 12).
The legislation prescribes procedures for formation, including provision for
notice, presentation of objections, and modifications of boundaries (sections 4, 5).
It authorizes the establishment of a tax base for the district (section 6), it provides
for financing by service or user charges, tax levies (including differential rates for
different classes of property and persons), special assessments (based on special
benefits), acceptance of grants, borrowing of money from local entities, and issuance of general obligation and revenue bonds (section 15); it confers other broad
corporate powers, including capacity to sue and be sued, to contract, to acquire
and dispose of property, to hire employees, etc. (sections 9, 13 ,14, 16, 20).
It requires the district to "offer to employ every person who, on the date the
district takes over function of a public corporation * * * in the district is employed
by the corporation * * * to carry on the function", and to protect such persons'
pension rights (section 24).
The governing body of the metropolitan districts would consist of a representative from each governing body of any county within its territory (with a minimum
of two such representatives) and three representatives from the governing bodies
of the cities in the district, chosen by a joint convention of the mayors of the cities
(section 9). The charter further provides that the voters of the district "may
exercise the powers of the initiative and referendum with reference to legislation
of the district * * * except as a charter the voters adopt for the district provides
to the contrary" (section 21).
The potential scope of the agency and its flexibility are materially restricted
by amendments adopted in committee, mainly at the instance of the City of Portland. These amendments eliminate the provisions for chartering the new agency
and changing its governmental structure or procedures, although there is still
provision for assumption of additional functions, through use of the initiative. In
general, the amendments seem to subject the agency to greater control by existing
ciites within its boundaries insofar as it may seek to engage in activities that may
have an impact on the "local aspects" of functions already carried on by those cities.
Even with these restrictive amendments, however, the instrumentality thus
proposed has some obvious advantages: It is specifically designed for immediate
operation, across county lines, of those utility-type activities that are of most
immediately pressing urgency. Its initial governing body is selected from among
elected officials whose normal duties include a degree of oversight in regard to
comprehensive planning in their respective communities; its legislative functions
remain subject to direct public control through the initiative and referendum and
for these and other reasons it obviously is likely to produce as politically sensitive
management as is possible — short of direct election (an alternative possible under
the bill in its original form if the voters should choose to provide for direct election
by charter). And the involvement of the elected officials affords some degree of
contact between transit planning and the related local governmental functions.
Hopefully, a politically sensitive governing board should be particularly alert to
the desirability of encouraging broad community participation in planning and
other decision-making processes.
Finally, the legislation is simple, brief and easily understood. The pattern of
metropolitan administration it anticipates — i.e. a simple metropolitan service
district in any given metropolitan area — would avoid unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of governmental bodies, each created for a special purpose.
Oregon already has too many special service districts—as noted above, some 400 in
the Portland metropolitan area alone. Your Committee views with concern the possibility that this proliferation of agencies may be extended to the metropolitan
community level.
Among the most obvious disadvantages of the measure are questions as to
whether a governing body of this nature will command public confidence and
support, as well as the political uncertainties created by the novelty of this type of
governmental entity and opposition to the scope of activities it is authorized to
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perform. Although this device obviously avoids the obstructive tactics of those
who are opposed to Port operation of transit, there are others who will question
whether the transit function is either compatible with or necessarily related to
the other functions that the legislation prescribes. Certainly the road to effective
action — or even to enactment of the legislation — may be blocked by those who
for one reason or another are opposed to metropolitan administration of such
facilities as sewers and solid<14waste disposal, or in fact opposed to the establishment
of any metropolitan entity. >
In the judgment of your Committee, however, these disadvantages are more
than substantially offset by the favorable aspects of the proposal.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. Portland's present public transportation crisis has two distinct aspects —
the near-term and the long-range. The near-term problem is to safeguard the
integrity of existing but wholly inadequate facilities for two reasons: First, to avoid
interruptions of service upon which a substantial segment of the community still
relies (however bad the service may be) — children, the aged, the poor, the
physically handicapped, and others unable to drive or own automobiles, not to
mention the downtown business community whose economic well-being is essential
to the preservation of the economic and other values of the core area. Second, to
avoid deterioration of the existing facilities and services toward a point of extinction — to a level that so discourages use and riding habits as to render irreversibly
the present downward spiral of patronage and service. The long-range problem is
to reverse the existing trend — to provide facilities and service that reasonably
meet the needs of a substantial segment of the community, to the end that the
entire metropolitan community may avoid strangulation by freeways, parking lots
and exhaust fumes.
2. The present crisis is the product of neglect — of public inattention to
immediate as well as future transportation needs of the area, of a tendency to drift
from crisis to crisis as the situation becomes progressively worse, of a failure of
the business, political and civic leadership of the community to look ahead to the
consequences of its inattentiveness. This chronic inability or unwillingness to look
ahead has resulted in a transit franchise that made the present crisis inevitable.
In no circumstances should the community tolerate a new franchise like the
present Rose City Transit franchise, or any regulation which extends its life
beyond the barest minimum term.
3. The present efforts of the City of Portland to terminate the Rose City
Transit franchise and to take over the Rose City Transit system may prove to be
a useful interim step toward long-range objectives, but at best they afford only a
temporary solution to the area's public transportation problem. The legitimacy of
the takeover has been challenged, and ensuing litigation may hold up an ultimate
solution until the existing franchise has virtually run its course. Moreover, the
City apparently has no long-range plans of its own for transit operation and may
in fact be incapable of achieving a long-range solution even if its takeover efforts
succeed. To effect a turn-around in the public's riding habits will require a massive
reorganization of transit services in a metropolitan area in which only about half
the population resides in the city itself; and City Government itself has recognized
that it lacks both the legal authority and the financial reserves to underwrite the
necessary expansion and improvement of facilities and service. The present takeover efforts appear to your Committee to be nothing more than a continuation
of
the "holding action" approach that has proved so disastrous in the past.(15)
(i+)Since preparation of the above commentary, the Sunday Oregonian, on April 20, 1969,
published a Bardsley poll undertaken to test reaction to SB 494 that showed 69 percent
of the voters of Multnomah, Washington and Clackamas counties in favor of, and only
13 percent opposed to, "the idea of a tricounty district * * * to deal with the problems
of sewage, mass transit and solid waste disposal". The poll showed 72 percent Democratic
and 65 percent Republican favoring such an agency.
(15)Your Committee has been advised that the City Council's Mass Transit Advisory Commission (a recently formed entity appointed about the same time as your Committee
began its studies) is presently developing long-range plans for transit operation.
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4. To achieve an adequately planned and operated transit system in the long
run, at least three considerations must be pursued:
(1) The area of operations and its financial base must include as much
as possible of the entire metropolitan area.
(2) There must be a harmony between public transportation and all
other aspects of the urban community — some tangible recognition of the
inter-relationship between transit operations and those aspects of the community's life that influence the planning of transit operations.
(3) Hie transportation system needs to enjoy the confidence of the
public through a continuing involvement of the citizenry in the processes
of planning and operations, so that the public gets the transportation
system that it actually needs and wants.
5. To accomplish the objectives stated in Item 4, the public needs to place
its mass transit problem in a planning and operating entity that transcends conventional local boundaries and has ample financing and other powers and adequate
management to achieve these ends. It is particularly important that such an agency
should possess the widest possible variety of financing powers and that it be closely
coordinated with whatever agency or agencies are responsible for the public functions pertaining to the planning of land uses and the programming of social
resources throughout the area being served.
6. Because of the fragmentation of local government within the metropolitan
area, these objectives can be accomplished only by legislative action of state government, through the establishment of a suitable areawide vehicle for transit management. Because of the imminent expiration of the existing Hose City franchise in
1972 and the risk of a breakdown in service before then, it is imperative for the
Legislature to act during its present session.
7. Each of the three bills now before the Legislature for this purpose has distinct merits and weaknesses. The bill most likely to meet the public's requirements
in this situation is SB 494 (Metropolitan Multipurpose Service District) because it
alone affords some reasonable prospect of closely coordinating transit planning
with other public planning and avoiding further fragmentation of public services
—particularly if it could be amended to make the directorate of the metropolitan
service district elective.
8. The other bills are notably weak in their omission of provision for comprehensive areawide planning and their tendency to insulate transit management from
direct control b\ the public most immediately concerned. Even though HB 1808
("Independent Transit Commission) as amended declares that the proposed transit
district is a "municipal corporation", and "a unit of local government" for limited
purposes, appointment of the directorate by the Governor in practical effect makes
it a Siate agency in terms of its responsibility to the constituency it serves, taxes
and bonds. This'aspect of both HB 1786 (Port of Portland) and HB 1808 appears
particularly inappropriate for an agency charged with functions so peculiarly local
and politically sensitive. However, the urgency of taking action now is so pressing
that enactment of any one of the three bills is preferable to doing nothing at all.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing discussion suggests that transit operations can be conducted
at a profit", at least at some level of service, but that they cannot be conducted for
profit in a manner that satisfies the needs of the community. The dilemma faced b\
the responsible public authorities is to find a way of meeting these needs according
to a formula that assures an underwriting of the costs of adequate transit services,
whether by user charges or by a combination of user charges and other means.
Your Committee at this time has no specific recommendations as to how this
objective can be accomplished under the City's proposed takeover or otherwise,
because, as noted in the introductory paragraphs, this is merely an interim report
horn of \our Committee's reali/ation that its immediate concern must be with
pending legislative proposals that may be a prerequisite to any reasonable solution
of the problem.
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In view of the rigid time limitation thus imposed on its efforts, your Committee accordingly confines its present recommendations to the following urgent
suggestions:
1. That the current Legislative Assembly enact one of the three bills
now before it that would permit the formation of an agency that could plan
and operate transit services on an areawide basis throughout all or most of
the Portland Metropolitan Area.
2. That the Legislative Assembly give preference in these considerations to SB 494, ideally with amendments that will place control of the
enterprise in a directorate selected by popular vote directly proportional to
the population served.
Respectfully submitted,
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